Allocation Layer — Sprint 1 Initial Notes¶
Date: 2026-05-03
Sprint goal: working allocation layer producing
largest_frontier_run_flop from supply outputs across the 4×4 = 16
combined-scenario cross-product.
What's in this sprint¶
data/assumptions/allocation_input_assumptions.yaml— 4 scenarios × milestones (2024 / 2030 / 2040) × 9 parameters per milestone (6 bucket shares + 3 training-decomposition multipliers).scenarios/allocation_*.yaml— 4 registration files (display name, description, assumption_scenario reference). Same pattern as supply.model/allocation_engine.py— load / interpolate / validate, plus the projection pipeline (cross-product, allocate buckets, frontier-lab decomposition, largest-run estimate, historical comparison).pipelines/allocation.py—uv run allocation. Reads supply CSV + historical trend, runs engine, writes 5 tables + 6 charts.pipelines/allocation_charts.py— 6 chart helpers.tests/test_allocation_engine.py— 9 tests covering all 8 invariants from the scope plus a negative test on share validation.
Headline numbers (base supply × base allocation)¶
| Year | Largest run (FLOP) | Share of total |
|---|---|---|
| 2024 | 1.39e+27 | 3.51% |
| 2030 | 2.39e+28 | 1.30% |
| 2040 | 6.93e+28 | 0.42% |
CAGR 2024→2040: 27.6% per year for the largest single frontier run. For comparison, the historical Rule A 2018+ extrapolation is 5.97× per year (497% CAGR). The historical extrapolation crosses through the realistic allocation envelope around 2027–2028 and continues skyward. By 2040 the historical extrapolation reaches ~1e+37 FLOP, versus realistic allocation projections in the 1e+27 to 1e+29 range.
Range across all 16 combined scenarios¶
The largest_run trajectory is dominated by allocation choice, not
supply choice. From outputs/tables/allocation_scenario_summary.csv:
| Combined scenario | 2024 | 2030 | 2040 | CAGR |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| capex_rich × training_race | 1.74e+27 | 1.53e+29 | 9.38e+29 | 48.1%/yr |
| base × training_race | 1.58e+27 | 7.84e+28 | 5.34e+29 | 43.9%/yr |
| capex_rich × rnd_acceleration | 1.53e+27 | 4.40e+28 | 1.60e+29 | 33.7%/yr |
| base × rnd_acceleration | 1.39e+27 | 2.25e+28 | 9.13e+28 | 29.9%/yr |
| capex_rich × base | 1.53e+27 | 4.66e+28 | 1.22e+29 | 31.4%/yr |
| base × base (headline) | 1.39e+27 | 2.39e+28 | 6.93e+28 | 27.6%/yr |
| chip_bottleneck × base | 1.34e+27 | 1.52e+28 | 2.75e+28 | 20.8%/yr |
| chip_bottleneck × inference_heavy | 9.52e+26 | 6.91e+27 | 7.84e+27 | 14.1%/yr |
| (... 8 more) |
The ratio of fastest (capex_rich × training_race, 48.1%/yr CAGR) to slowest (chip_bottleneck × inference_heavy, 14.1%/yr CAGR) is roughly 4× over 16 years, or ~50× by 2040 in absolute FLOP.
Three observations worth flagging now¶
1. Allocation choice dominates supply choice for the largest-run trajectory.¶
In the cross-product chart (outputs/charts/allocation_largest_frontier_run.png),
the four allocation-scenario "color bands" stack vertically by ~0.7
OOM by 2040, while the four supply-scenario "marker variants" within
each color band only spread by ~0.3 OOM. This means: the political /
strategic question of how compute is allocated matters more for
frontier-run trajectories than the physical question of how much
compute exists in total.
2. The frontier-run share of total compute falls in every scenario.¶
This is the central allocation insight: even under the training-race scenario where labs prioritize frontier runs, total usable compute scales faster than any single training run can absorb. By 2040 the largest run is < 4% of total compute even in the most concentrated scenario, vs ~3.5% in 2024. The "compute is consumed by inference serving" narrative holds across scenarios.
3. The historical Rule A 2018+ trend is unreproducible on supply fundamentals + reasonable allocation.¶
The vs-historical chart (outputs/charts/allocation_vs_historical_training_compute.png)
shows the historical extrapolation crosses above every allocation
projection by ~2027 and reaches ~1e+37 FLOP by 2040. No combination
of supply + allocation under our assumptions reproduces 5.97×/yr
single-run growth. This is what the orientation docs warned about,
now made concrete by an actual single-run forward projection. Three
honest readings:
- The historical trend was already slowing. Recent frontier models are clustered between 1e25 and 1e26 FLOP rather than continuing the 5.97× pace; the historical fit gives equal weight to the steeper 2018-2022 era.
- Allocation parameters are conservative. The training-race scenario at 35% training share + 65% frontier-lab share + 15% largest-run concentration is at the upper bound of plausible — but not implausible. If realistic concentration is closer to 20-25%, the gap closes by ~1 OOM.
- Supply fundamentals genuinely cap single-run growth. Even capex_rich + training_race at 48.1%/yr CAGR is one full OOM/yr slower than the historical 5.97×/yr.
All three are probably partly true. Phase 4 (effective compute) and Phase 5 (capability mapping) will reframe this from "single-run FLOP" to "effective single-run training-equivalent FLOP" and may close some of the apparent gap.
What the next pass should do¶
Not in this sprint, but candidates for refinement:
- Source the allocation parameters. Currently all values are
confidence: mediumfrom the upstream scope defaults. Hyperscaler 10-Ks, lab disclosures, and academic estimates of the largest-run concentration parameter could move the central estimates and tighten the bounds. - Add a fragmented-market scenario. The scope offers
allocation_fragmented_marketas optional; could add as a 5th allocation scenario if cluster-contiguity becomes a bigger story. - Time-vary the supply scenario weights. Currently each combined scenario assumes the same supply scenario across all 17 years; a scenario where the binding constraint shifts mid-horizon would be more realistic.
Open questions¶
- Should the largest-run concentration parameter be calibrated to 2018-2024 backcast? The historical Rule A 2018+ trend is observable; the allocation model should be able to reproduce the historical single-run trajectory in backcast. The current assumptions are forward-only; a backcast calibration would tighten the 2024 starting values.
- How should the cluster_contiguity_factor evolve? Currently modeled as monotonically declining (geographic / cluster-size fragmentation grows). Could go the other way if frontier labs keep building larger dedicated campuses (Stargate-style).
- What's the inference / training split within a frontier lab? We model frontier_lab_training_share as one number per scenario; in practice some labs (e.g. inference-heavy commercial) will have a very different split from others (e.g. capability-focused safety labs). A weighted-by-lab decomposition could be a future refinement.
Recommended (provisional) effective-compute layer inputs¶
These will live in docs/allocation_findings.md once the memo is
finalized. Provisional from sprint 1:
largest_frontier_run_flop_by_year— already emitted; the headline Phase 4 input.training_compute_flop_year,ai_rnd_experiment_compute_flop_year,post_training_compute_flop_year,inference_compute_flop_year— bucket-level totals.frontier_run_share_of_total_compute— for sensitivity testing.- Recommended scenario envelope:
- Slow: chip_bottleneck × inference_heavy (CAGR 14.1%)
- Base: base × base (CAGR 27.6%)
- Fast: capex_rich × training_race (CAGR 48.1%)